In the paper, an attempt of eliminating a certain supposed internal contradiction in the concept of Janusz Bieniak concerning the role and position of junior members of the Piast dynasty in the territorial governance of the so called second Polish monarchy (ca 1040-1177) was undertaken. As the result of the conducted reasoning, three probable and one hypothetic model of engaging the junior Piasts in the management of provinces were discerned, two of which (1. and 2.) included co-existence in a given province of a Piast duke and a noblemen appointed by the "grand duke" (princeps), and two: officiating of sole members of the dynasty as governors or rulers in the provinces of the monarchy. All those models must be taken into account in further research on the constitutional and political history of the Piast state in the eleventh and twelfth centuries.
Given the wealth of the accumulated research and the lack of any new sources, the constitutional history of the second Piast monarchy is one of the subjects where there is little room for progress. Any attempt to revisit that fi eld -barring a most unlikely revolutionary shake-up -cannot but follow the well-trodden paths and hope, at best, to add a weighty footnote to the work of others. It is no diff erent with this article, which is a gloss, or a note-and-query, added to Janusz Bieniak's well-founded, terse characterization of Poland's political and constitutional system in the 12 th century. In his view, it functioned until at least 1177 unaff ected by the division of the country into fi ve principalities (enacted in 1138), because Bolesław the Wrymouth's (Bolesław Krzywousty) Krzysztof Fokt descendants held their provinces as governors on behalf of their senior (princeps) rather than hereditary rulers.
2 Janusz Bieniak's concept of the 12 th -century Piast state, based to a large extent on analogies with well-attested history of Early Rus', was generally accepted by scholars, 3 yet it does rest on a fundamental contradiction. He claims that the brothers and sons of the princeps ruled their provinces as governors (like the junior Rurikids) without making clear how that could be squared with the function of the serving comes, i.e. the provincial governor acting as the grand duke's deputy. In the early 1980s, that did not look inconsistent for when Bieniak was working out his concept the offi ce of the comes was still thought to be identical with that of a castellan in the 13 th -century principalities. Only when that anachronistic assumption was corrected the inconsistency became all too obvious. 4 If, as we now know, in the second Piast monarchy there was no autonomous network of castellans (castle-lords), it is hard to see why the Piast dukes were to function alongside other provincial governors. In other words, why should not they, like their Russian counterparts, act as governors themselves (in lieu of posadniks chosen from among the boyars)? The idea of administrative dualism, i.e. the co-existence of two high-ranking offi cials with overlapping competences in the same territorial domain, was common in medieval Germany -where royal (imperial) deputies, counts palatine (Pfalzgrafen) and burggraves or castle-lords (Burggrafen), functioned alongside princ- [Sacra Silentii provincia: Eight hundred years of a hereditary Duchy of Opole (1202 Opole ( -2002 ], ed. A. Pobóg--Lenartowicz, Opole 2003, pp. 37-81, with bibliography II, vol. 2, Kraków 1952, II, 7, p. 74. 7 Most notably by Janusz Bieniak who dismisses the idea that Władysław Herman would hold on to a few key castle towns out of hand. It would, he argues, lead to the unnatural division of "a integral unit formed by a castle town and its adjacent territory" and create "inconceivable administrative problems" (J. Bieniak, Polska elita…, part 1, p. 20, note 44) . However, in neighbouring Germany the prospect of such dire consequences did not deter Emperor Henry IV from strengthening the institution of the imperial palatine count and creating the Burggrafschaft of Meißen. Consequently, there seems to be no reason why the Piast grand dukes should fi nd such a model of governance absurd or impracticable. 10 In eff ect this evidence indicates that when Władysław I Herman signed over the southewestern part of his realm to his younger son he also appointed a comes, a person who had his full trust and whose duty was not just to take care of the infant prince, but also to look after the princeps' interests in Bolesław's domain.
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Unfortunately, the history of the second Piast monarchy off ers no clear analogies to the situation discussed above, i.e. the cohabitation of a prince and a comes palatine (Pfalzgraf). The only other possible example of such an arrangement was Władysław II the Exile's appointment of Piotr Włostowic as his acting representative (comes) in Wrocław at a time when formally the government of Silesia was devolved to his elder son Bolesław I the Tall (Bolesław I Wysoki).
12 However, for the analogy to hold water it were necessary to prove that (1) 
Model II: The prince and the governor
Another model of co-existence in the provincial capital of the junior duke and the central --government offi cial (governor) has been used in the narrative of the 1093 rebellion which successfully reinstated the banished Zbigniew, Władysław Herman's fi rst-born son, as heir apparent. According to the Gallus Anonymus' Gesta, Zbigniew was welcomed in Wrocław by comes nomine Magnus, and some time later his authority over the province of Silesia was legitimized by his father. That created a rather odd situation: an acting provincial governor had to co-exist with a Piast dynast. 15 In comparison with the cohabitation in Wrocław of Bolesław and comes Wojsław, discussed above, the post-1093 alignment of Magnus and Zbigniew was characterized by a greater degree of decentralization, or, to borrow Gallus Anonymus' turn of phrase, Duke Władysław I Herman sedem Wratislaviensem de manu sua dimisit. While it is highly improbable Kuczyński, Warszawa 1990, p. 33) , who argues that such a cumulation would make it impossible to exercise "either one of the those offi ces or the other" is hardly persuasive. At that time such offi ces involved not only executive functions, but were also, or even primarily, dignities signalling high rank (cf. Th. Zotz, Im Amt und Würden: Zur Eigenart "offizieller". Positionen im früheren Mittelalter, "Tel Aviver Jahrbuch für deutsche Geschichte" 1993, vol. 22, pp. 1-23) . It seems most improbable that Piotr Włostowic's promotion to the rank of count palatine would make him abandon his Wrocław post, a position he had worked hard to build up and consolidate through, among others, setting up foundations on an unprecedented scale.
15 Galli Anonymi cronica…, II, 4, p. 71. Unfortunately, the chronicler fails to defi ne the status of Zbigniew in unambiguous terms. As a result quite a number of historians have been downright skeptical of the claim that the legitimization of Zbigniew as heir apparent was followed by his instalment that the instalment of Zbigniew as junior duke in the Silesian capital would result in the demotion or reducing the competences of the Władysław Herman's governor, it is also hard to imagine that the status of new junior duke would be lower than that of Magnus. This shows how diff erent this situation was from the apparently similar instalment in Wrocław of the young Bolesław the Wrymouth. In the former case Władysław I Herman practically let go the reins of power. He did not appoint an offi cial (comes) to look after his elder son, and, moreover, he had to accept that Silesia fell under the dual rule of Zbigniew and Magnus, de facto acting fairly independently of the central government. In practice, decentralization meant the devolution of the treasury for -if Magnus retained his position -the newly created duke who had to be provided with at least a portion of the revenues of the Duchy of Silesia that had been collected for the duke senior. 16 Apart from that one example in so called Gallus Anonymus' Gesta) discussed above it is hard to fi nd more accounts of a relationship between prince (junior duke) and comes (representative of duke senior) that would fi t Model II. In fact, though, there seems to be just one more good historical example which exhibits the structural characteristics of Model II. It is a late 12 th century story, which features the "cohabitation" of Leszek Bolesławowic, the son of Bolesław IV the Curly (Bolesław Kędzierzawy), and comes Żyra, governor of Mazovia. Żyra enters the scene as a governor (comes) of Mazovia (probably as early as 1161); 17 then during the fi rst reign of Mieszko III the Old (Mieszko III Stary) and in the early years of the reign of Kazimierz II the Just (Kazimierz II Sprawiedliwy) he combined the offi ce of governor with the guardianship of the minor prince; and fi nally acted as voivode (count palatine) of Mazovia in the entourage of the adult Duke Leszek. 18 To assume that formally his position remained unchanged in the course of three successive reigns would certainly be too hasty. However, if the career of this Mazovian nobleman began with the governorship of a province and in its next phase involved the guardianship of a minor prince, it certainly fi ts the pattern set out in Model II. 16 We can fi nd no reference in the contemporary sources to the division of provincial revenues between the duke senior or his governors and the junior dukes with the appropriate titles. In both these cases Model II has been applied to a situation where a junior duke of the Piast dynasty is paired off with a fi gure of authority in a provincial setting (Zbigniew and Magnus, Leszek Bolesławowic and Żyra). One may wonder if these situations resulted from the operation of chance, or to put it diff erently, represented one-off solutions to certain problems brought up by the course of events. Yet, it would be wrong to write them off as insignifi cant. The idea of "dual governorship" could, paradoxically, appear attractive to the senior dukes for it allowed them to maintain a certain balance at the top, i.e. provide a title and a source of income for the junior duke(s) -even at the cost of the grand duke's share -without taking away lucrative territorial posts from the most powerful, and potentially dangerous, members of the political elite. This reasoning may well have been behind a document issued in 1139 by Bishop Robert of Wrocław. While mentioning the younger sons of Bolesław III the Wrymouth and their possessions (duchies), it calls them co-regents of the state. 19 It cannot be ruled out that this triumvirate participated jointly in a portion of the provincial revenues earmarked for the central government; such a system enabled the maintenance of governors recruited from the political elite and acting on behalf of the senioral centre of power. 20 In eff ect, it may be surmised that the "dual governorship" Model II was more common than it is possible to make out at this stage of research.
Model III: The prince as governor
Among the dozen or so examples of the co-existence of princes and comites collected by Janusz Bieniak 21 there are some that fi t neither of the two models that have been presented above. The diffi culties in classifying the individual cases have their cause in the paucity and obliqueness of the sources. Our data base contains for the most part 19 Schlesisches Urkundenbuch, vol. 1: 971-1230 20 We have no reliable information about the participation of junior dukes in the revenue designated for the duke senior during the reign of Bolesław IV the Curly. However, what we do know is that the latter kept the privilege of mint to himself, but there are some indications that he shared with his brothers some of the revenue from the Wieliczka salt mine (in the senioral province). Cf. M. Biniaś-Szkopek, Bolesław Kędzierzawy [Bolesław the Curly], Poznań 2014, pp. 239-241. 21 He presented the relevant data in his catalogue of offi cials of the 12 th and 13 th centuries in the Appendix to the last part of his study of Polish political elites of the 12 th century, part IV B (see note 13 above). That list does not include the casus of the parallel functioning in Wrocław of Bolesław the Tall and Piotr Włostowic (J. Bieniak expressly excluded it, cf. J. Bieniak, Polska elita…, part III A, p. 33). The case has been discussed above. 12 th -century lists of names, often loosely attached to later forgeries. Their exegesis depends heavily on the researcher's assumptions and interpretive key. The sensitivity of those instruments depends in turn on further progress in the study of Poland's 12 th -century political and constitutional history. But even without additional, in-depth study it is possible to distinguish another, third model of co-existence of Piast princes du sang and state offi cials (governors). It could be called a "pure" model of government in which the latter function was handed over to the junior dukes (who had thus acquired the status of comites, or, to use a Ruthenian analogy, posadniki).
Gallus Anonymus' account of the old Duke Władysław's apportionment would have been straight enough were it not for the somewhat diff erent treatment of his two sons. Bolesław's portion did not include its capital city Wrocław, which, we are told, his father de manu sua non dimisit, while no reservations were attached to Zbigniew's rights over the capital city of his province (presumably Gniezno). 22 In eff ect, it meant that Zbigniew became governor of the northwestern province (Wielkopolska). His position was therefore more comfortable than that of his younger brother who had to put up with a comes (guardian). 23 The chronicler tries to make light of this imbalance by embellishing the importance of the southern sedes Regni -he calls them principales -and thus to justify Władysław Herman's decision to have direct control over Wrocław (through his representative, comes Wojsław). In a similar way, after his father's death and his brother's victory in civil war, Zbigniew held Mazovia as an ordinary comes, i.e. sicut miles, non ut dominus.
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It is quite possible that the next generations of the Piasts -before the unravelling of the monarchy -resorted to this model of government. So for instance historians have noted that unlike Bolesław IV the Curly and Mieszko III, their younger brother Henry's lordship over the Province (Land) of Sandomierz was designated dominium rather than ducatus. The diff erent legal titles most probably encode diff erences of their holders' rank and status (here the elder versus the younger brothers). 25 After his return from ex-22 Gerard Labuda denies the accuracy of Gallus Anonymus account, but does not give any reason why we are to believe it to be false (cf. Władysław i Zbigniew…, p. 20). Equally unconvincing is a similar attempt to reinterpret the story of the two brothers in Karol Maleczyński's study Bolesław Krzywousty. Zarys panowania [Bolesław the Wrymouth: An outline history of his reign], Kraków 1947, pp. 23-24 . Maleczyński assumes that Gallus had a special interest in Bolesław and therefore mentioned the fact of his not getting control over Wrocław but passed over a similar restriction with regard to Zbigniew (presumably out of sympathy with the latter). This string of conjectures seems both unfounded and improbable. After all, the logic of the chronicler's narrative suggests the opposite. Gallus Anonymus tries to suggest that the idea of the sedes regni principales did not put Bolesław at a disadvantage (cf. Book II, Ch. 7), but rather put him in better position (so Book II, Ch. 8). At the same time, though, the narrator's rhetoric opens up a diff erent picture. Whereas the fi rst apportionment left the younger brother worse off , the provisions for the devolution of titles and land after Władysław I Herman's death were fair and just. 23 This disparity was noted by Roman Grodecki (Zbigniew…, . He was also absolutely right about the bias of the Gallus Anonymus' Gesta, but not quite so in his assessment of the scope of the junior dukes' territorial possessions. For a critical view of Grodecki's approach, see K. Maleczyński, Bolesław Krzywousty…, pp. 23-24 (for a polemic with the latter, see note 21); and A. Krawiec ile, Bolesław the Tall, too, must have ruled Silesia as a dominium for as far as we know there was no other comes in Wrocław in his time. In this case we can look for cues not only in the records but also in the peculiarities of Silesia's institutional history. One such peculiarity is the prominent role of the offi ce of the camerarius, which was the highest court dignity in fact identical with that of count palatine, but probably originated from the offi ce of the chamberlain at the ducal court. 26 In other parts of Poland the dignity of palatine was descended from the offi ce of provincial governor, as e.g. in Mazovia under Leszek Bolesławowic. There comes Żyra held the post of governor which was later transformed into the offi ce of a palatine (voivode). Moreover, in Silesia the duke senior continued to exercise far reaching power until 1177 as was shown in 1175 by his treatment of the Cistercian Abbey at Lubiąż (Kloster Leubus) as his own foundation and its true founder, Duke Bolesław I the Tall, as the monks' advocatus (Kirchenvogt).
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Model IV (hypothetical): Princes as de facto independent rulers
The three structural models presented above do not take account of all the ways in which the junior Piast dynasts were made to take up responsibilities in the apparatus of territorial government. One scenario which is obviously missing from this array is the situation when a junior duke were to be endowed with signifi cantly broader competences than those of an ordinary governor and would take over power in his province in the absence of a governor (comes) appointed by the princeps. The sources from the time of the second Piast monarchy provide no watertight historical casus to illustrate such a confi guration, yet the idea itself was entirely at odds with contemporary realities. After all, in 1102-1107 Poland was de facto a diarchy, or a duumvirate, i.e. it was co-ruled, by Zbigniew and Bolesław. If that was possible, why not allow another hypothetical model (Model IV) in which the dukes accept the princeps' primacy in general, as a matter of form, but behave like any head of an independent state? Actually, this formula could be an apt description of the status of Mieszko III the Old during the seniorate of Bolesław IV the Curly -it could, perhaps, but there is no way to reach certainty on this point one way or the other.
28 And, at any rate, the modus operandi just described could have resulted from a single decision, but it could also have been the outcome of a longer process that was triggered by an "ordinary" governorship (Model III).
Conclusion and recommendations
The foregoing analysis shows that the constitutional reality of the second Piast monarchy was far more complex than it is usually believed to be, and Janusz Bieniak's concept of the junior Piast dukes' devolved rule needs to be developed and expanded. The evidence of Gallus Anonymus' Gesta indicates that as early as the end of the 11 th century (i.e. the late years of Władysław Herman's rule) there were already in place three distinct models of funding the junior dukes. They are as follows: (1) Model I, or dual administration, where the the Piast prince is accompanied by a comes whose function is to represent the interests of the duke senior; (2) Model II, or double-track administration, where the Piast prince functions alongside a separately appointed comes (provincial governor); the funding for the prince probably comes from a portion of the revenue collected for the duke senior; and (3) Model III, or uniform (single-track) administration, where all powers at the regional level are concentrated in the hands of one person: the prince du sang is vested with all the competences of a governor (as in Rus'). These models have been constructed in the process of inductive interpretation of the historical record set down in Poland's earliest chronicle; in the next step, their operation have been projected (usually in the conjectural mode) onto situations from a later period, which is better documented though often enough the sources do not off er suffi cient insight into constitutional matters. At the same time it is hard to brush off the impression (which can harden into an objection) that the constructs abstracted from Gallus Anonymus' Gesta are in fact individual cases illustrating concrete problems of territorial administration and solutions, each of them determined by a peculiar set of circumstances. Be that as it may, I am convinced my extrapolations make sense and can be treated as "models", a term chosen not only for its appropriateness but also because it should help put the problem discussed in this article on the agenda on medieval studies. More research is need to explore all aspects of the employment of junior dukes in the provincial administration in the 11 th -12 th centuries, i.e. whether there were any regular or formalized ways of doing it, what were the diff erences between the individual rulers enacting that practice, or, last but not least, if it was inspired, case by case, by some external factors.
The procedure covered by the fi rst model may have been inspired by German examples. That the political practices of the Salian emperors had some infl uence on the conduct of Władysław Herman and his close advisor, count palatine Sieciech, was rightly noted by Sławomir Gawlas in his groundbreaking study of the evolution of Poland's political system in the 11 th -13 th centuries. One of the concomitants of the policy aimed at strengthening the power of the Duke Senior was the undermining of the position of the territorial comites by the creation of a tier of offi cials (pristaldi) loyal to the central authority that appointed them.
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However, it would not be right to assume that in the particular case of "cohabitation" of Duke Bolesław and comes Wojsław the latter was a pristaldus. Wojsław was a powerful noble while the pristaldi, judging by the references in Gallus' Gesta, were men of lower rank. Bolesław's rule in Silesia should be treated as the more complicated balancing act in so far as his powers were curtailed too by the alienation of sedes regni Wratislaviensis. One may wonder whether the very idea of putting a curb on the younger duke had in it the seeds of a backlash, though eventually Bolesław and Zbigniew rose up against their father, or whether the initial success of the scheme was due to Bolesław's young age.
Another moot point worth researching is the question if and to what extent this model, which no doubt strongly promoted the interest of the duke senior, was resorted to in the ominous late phase of second monarchy, i.e. the fi fth and sixth generation of the historic Piasts. The facts suggest that no use was made of it, or if there was eff ort to use it not much came of it (as shown by the case of Piotr Włostowic, assuming that he did function as comes palatine in Wrocław). It all boils down to one inescapable conclusion: the senior princes of the 12 th century had only limited control over the devolved provinces. This assessment is confi rmed by the lack of unequivocal evidence of the reception in Poland prior to 1177 of the institution of the Burggrafschaft. In Germany under the last Salians and the fi rst two Staufen it became an important instrument of consolidating royal power. 30 The role of the Burggrafschaft was even greater in the eastern parts of the Empire (east of the River Saale) -not only did it make estate management more effi cient but also undercut the power of the Markgrafen through the creation of a mosaic of enclaves where the king ruled supreme.
In spite of great attractiveness of this administrative innovation, its Polish equivalent, the institution of the castellany (headed by a kasztelan, Lat. castellanus, or lord of a castle), did not make its appearance in the Piast-ruled lands until the turn of the 12 th century. 31 We can fi nd only few enigmatic records that seem to indicate the presence of castellans in Cracow 32 and Kruszwica 33 in the end phase of the second Piast monarchy, i.e. under Bolesław IV the Curly and during the fi rst reign of Mieszko III the Old. 34 The fi rst -rather feeble and, as it turned out, ephemeral -phase of its reception in Poland took place before the constitutional crisis of 1177-1180 and aff ected only the domain of the duke senior. No castellanies were founded at that time in the lands ruled by the junior dukes. The next phase, however, saw a complete reversal as all the castellans mentioned in the sources from the 13 th century were installed by the junior dukes. The failure of the senior dukes of the fi fth, sixth and seventh generation of Piast dynasty to push through their plans of strengthening the centre of government should come as no surprise. Those who tried to impose their will on others (Władysław I Herman, Władysław II the Exile, Mieszko III the Old) failed dismally, while those who relied on a consensual approach and took care not to antagonize too much their relatives or political strongmen were able to hold on to the throne and make their plans work.
One the means at their disposal was the procedure of Model II, ceding the administration of a devolved province to a junior duke and a comes who represented the central government. This arrangement came at a price -the senior duke's partial loss of control and revenue.
More " 1981, vol. 88, issue 3, p. 720 and passim) , whereas the majority of scholars who examined the Mogilno forgeries dates that list back to the 1190s (for a survey of critical opinions and the author's own solution of the problem, see M. Kosonowski, Dokumenty…, . As things stand, neither option can be ruled out. Nonetheless, as the date 1176 is directly attached to the list in the source, the weight of that record must not be underestimated. 34 The claim that there was at that time yet another castellany, namely Wizna (Castrum Wizna), is highly implausible. For a scrutiny and a refutation of that claim, see G. Białuński devolved power in the hands of one person, i.e. the replacement of members of the noble elite (posadniki) by Piast princes du sang, has none of those advantages. It leaves the ruler no room for maneuver, i.e. in the real world of the 12 th century it would not allow the duke senior to hold out rewards to buy the loyalty of the noble elite, nor would it let him use those noblemen qua governors to hold in check his own family, the junior dukes. For the latter, it goes without saying, the third model would be most attractive.
Janusz Bieniak is basically right in saying that government by deputy (namiestnictwo), at times made less transparent by the installation of a provincial governor (comes), was the key feature of the administration of the provinces under the second Piast monarchy. This characterization corresponds to Model II and III of the typology presented in this article. However, the chances that we will ever know on how many occasions the prince and the comes formed a provincial duumvirate are practically nil as our main source for 12 th -century provincial elites are offi cial registers, i.e. lists of names stripped of any additional information. Consequently, the modern reader is left to guess whether the person listed next to the junior duke was an offi ce-holder and what that offi ce may have been. Depending on the authority we choose to follow, Józef Spors, Janusz Bieniak or Tadeusz Lalik, we will identify that person as the duke's camerarius, comes castellanus or comes palatinus respectively. Be that as it may, there can be no doubt that the dominant role in the political practice of 12 th -century Poland was played by Model II and III. This conclusion should at last dispel the ghost of "Piast despotism" which has been haunting Polish medieval studies. Like their counterparts in Germany and Bohemia, the Piast senior dukes were compelled to develop a consensual style of government 36 in alliance with a social elite made up of other members of the ruling family 37 and the most powerful noblemen. Schlick, König, Fürsten und Reich (1056 -1159 : Herrschaftsverständnis im Wandel, Mittelalter-Forschungen, vol. 7, Stuttgart 2001 . It would not be possible to write an equally comprehensive study of that aspect of Polish history due to the paucity of sources for the Age of the Piasts. Nevertheless, Janusza Bieniak's in-depth studies of 12 th -century Polish noble elites and their relations with the ruling dynasty leave hardly any doubt that powerful noblemen who were no relatives of the Piasts were to some extent involved in the business of ruling the country. Finally, let me bring in a quote from Karol Modzelewski, the leading proponent of the view that the key characteristic Central and Eastern European states in the 11 th and 12 th centuries was a strong ducal government and an economically weak nobility. In his study of Poland's economy in the Age of the Piasts Modzelewski admits that "those monarchies were closer to an aristocratic oligarchy than despotism" (K. Modzelewski, Chłopi…, p. 159). 37 The elites of the fi rst and second Piast monarchy were aware of claims of all the members of ruling family (clan) to have a share in power. How that issue functioned in the consciousness of the ruling elite and other contemporary power brokers is the subject of an incisive study by Zbigniew Dalewski (Modele władzy dynastycznej…). Cf. also a telling quote from J. Bieniak, Polska elita…, part I, p. 48 
